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Chapter 7  
 
SOCIAL CAPITAL AS CULTURE? PROMOTING COOPERATIVE ACTION 
IN GHANA 
 
GINA PORTER AND FERGUS LYON  
 
In this chapter we focus on culture and its complex interconnections with the concept 
of social capital. Our study is set in the context of recent preoccupations of the World 
Bank (followed by other donors) with the concept of social capital itself and the 
related construct that it can be built in order to promote economic growth and 
development.  The adoption of the social capital concept is perhaps the closest that the 
World Bank has come in recent years in its recognition of the potential linkages 
between local cultures (notably cultures of enterprise), economic growth and 
development. That is not to say that we agree that culture is social capital – or vice 
versa. Far from it, indeed! Our thesis is rather that the World Bank has taken up social 
capital in a highly essentialized form - as group cooperation per se - in its 
development initiatives, whilst at the same time congratulating itself on its adoption 
of a more culturally (as opposed to economistically) oriented development paradigm.  
The Bank’s conflation of social capital construction with group activities, and its 
consequent efforts to promote development through supporting group-based 
initiatives, far from illustrating a cultural turn in its development thinking, arguably 
reflect a continuing lack of sensitivity to cultural diversity and the specific 
geographical contexts within which diverse cultural registers (elite, popular and youth 
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cultures, among others) evolve and interact (see also Nederveen Pieterse, this 
volume).   
 
Following a brief introduction to the links between concepts of social capital and 
culture, we review recent development problems and donor activities in Ghana. We 
then present two rural case studies of group-based development interventions in 
Ghana’s coastal savanna to illustrate our argument that while culture is complex, 
multi-faceted and inextricably linked with place and time dynamics, recent 
development interventions seemingly emanating out of donors’ desire to build social 
capital have been based on very poor conceptualizations of culture. 
 
SOCIAL CAPITAL, CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT  
Social capital is, as Harriss (2002) observes, a slippery concept. Widely publicized 
through the work of Putnam (1993, 1995), it focuses on the potential benefits of 
associational life and collective action. The positive value of social relations built on 
trust, norms and networks is a central theme, though precisely how these relations are 
initiated and sustained, and by whom, lacks explication. Nonetheless, social capital is 
assumed by much of the donor community to bring voluntary cooperation that leads 
to improved welfare and economic performance (Barr and Toye 2000). This focus on 
social interaction as a positive win-win situation of empowerment and inclusion 
(DeFilippis 2002) has been extremely seductive to development specialists mired in 
their persistent failure to find solutions to seemingly intractable poverty problems. 
There has been a growing view that interventions are possible which can harness 
underlying social forces and energy in society and thus expand social capital and 
correct for state and market failures (Mayer and Rankin 2002). Consequently, social 
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capital 'has become one of the central organizing themes in global development work' 
(De Filippis 2002), in no small part due to its adoption by economists at the World 
Bank, where it was identified in a 1997 publication as a developmental ‘missing link’ 
(Harriss 2002:797) 
 
The linkages between social capital and culture are complex. Much depends, of 
course, on how we define culture, another notoriously slippery concept (Mitchell 
2000). Here, drawing on Rankin’s (2003) efforts to combine standard recent 
anthropological interpretations of culture (as opposed to Cultural Studies 
perspectives) with geographical concerns for the significance of place and scale, we 
conceptualize culture as a grounded dynamic and symbolic entity. It encompasses 
people’s actions, shared beliefs, value, behavior and the meanings they assign to their 
world and those actions. This includes recognition of the potential of both history and 
multiple, intersecting spatial scales, to shape (and be shaped) by those actions and 
meanings (for further discussion of these themes see Introduction, this volume).   
 
The concept of social capital has opened an opportunity for economists and non social 
scientists to consider the concept of culture. However, the ways in which the terms 
social capital and culture are interpreted requires examination. Putnam defines social 
capital as trust, networks and norms each of which is underpinned and shaped by 
cultural contexts (Putnam 1993). Putnam examines the spatial differences of social 
capital by focusing on accumulation of social capital within locally based national-
ethnic populations (compare Watts, this volume; Nederveen Pieterse, this volume). 
From this perspective, the concept appears an attractive route to benefit poor people: 
thus, logically attractive to many development organizations and their staff.   
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However, recent analyses of the social capital model have raised numerous questions. 
These center around debates as to whether social capital is a way of opening 
economistic approaches to development to issues of cultural specificity, or whether it 
is a way for economics to colonize other social sciences. Fine’s argument that the 
model has a tendency to ignore the existence of power relations and conflict, that 
‘social capital is ahistorical and asocial, so it is complicit with mainstream economics’ 
(Fine 2002:797), has gained particularly widespread support from academic 
researchers. Meanwhile, a number of empirical studies have illustrated the ‘down-
side’ to social capital in poor countries: the exclusions, clientalism and backlash 
which have accompanied many supposedly pro-poor grass-roots development projects 
(for example Mayoux 2001; Momsen 2001). These studies graphically remind us how 
effectively power relations can distort the ‘harmonious sociability’ romantically 
ascribed to communities, severely reducing the potential to build extensive networks 
of trust (on expectations around community, see Watts, this volume). In response, 
proponents of social capital make the distinction of bonding social capital (within a 
community) and bridging social capital (outside a community) and linking social 
capital (ties between people of different wealth and status) (Woolcock 2000; also 
Nederveen Pieterse, this volume). However, in practice, development interventions 
tend to be preoccupied with bonding social capital. 
 
This chapter extends and refines these broad criticisms that local power relations may 
severely impede externally generated interventions aimed at building local social 
capital, by emphasizing the specific role that space and place play in shaping local 
cultures of cooperation or non-cooperation. We show how in Ghana, as in so many 
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other countries’ recent development programs, there has been a widespread tendency 
to reduce the concept of social capital to mean merely ‘membership in local, 
voluntary associations’ (Harriss 2002), and then to apply this blueprint of group 
cooperation in an asocial and aspatial manner that ignores local specificities of place, 
space and cultural context. The remarkable lack of geographical imagination evident 
in recent developmental applications of social capital adds yet another nail to its 
coffin.   
 
AFRICA’S ‘BEACON OF HOPE’: DONOR PERCEPTIONS OF LATE 
TWENTIETH AND EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GHANA  
In recent years Ghana, a small West African country of around 18 million people, has 
arguably become nothing less than a donor’s darling. A recent UK DFID document 
refers to it as ‘a beacon of hope and stability amidst a turbulent region’ (DFID 
2002:7).  Although continued dependence on primary products (gold, cocoa, timber) 
has limited Ghana’s potential for rapid economic growth, it is seen to be ‘favored by a 
healthy democracy and a strong independent media’ (ibid).  Ethnic and religious 
tensions occasionally emerge, but strife tends to be spatially circumscribed. The 
successful transition from government by Rawlings’ NDC to Kufuor’s NPP 
government in December 2000 was marked as a particularly notable success.   
 
Ghana has recorded some significant firsts in its recent history: notably, first African 
country to achieve independence (1957), and first country to implement a (painful) 
World Bank/IMF structural adjustment program (1983). The latter program marked 
the start of a long relationship with the World Bank which continues through to the 
present. Unlike its more truculent near-neighbor Nigeria, the Ghanaian government 
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has mostly tried to work with donor agendas to reduce the poverty that persists across 
the country, but is particularly widespread in its three northern regions.   
 
So far as expatriate staff are concerned, Ghana (by comparison with other African 
countries) is a very good place to be located: above all, violence is low, Ghanaians are 
extremely welcoming to strangers, and many donors perceive a national ethos around 
avoiding tension and strife (to the extent that one donor interviewed suggested that 
Ghanaian culture may be ‘dangerously confluent’) (Authors’ interviews with donor 
staff, 2003-2004). The relative ease of working in Ghana with Ghanaians cannot be 
ignored as a factor which encourages continued donor support to the country. This 
perception of cultural harmony may have an important bearing on recent donor 
interventions to support the country’s ‘latent entrepreneurship’ (DFID 2002:7), since 
the tendency to see Ghanaians as essentially collaborative also makes them supremely 
suited subjects for experiments in social capital building. The fact that Ghana is 
widely recognized and represented as a country with a rich traditional associational 
life (Atingdui et al. 1998), gives an additional impetus to donor expectations.  
 
DONORS AND DEVELOPMENT IN GHANA: THE ROLE OF THE LOCAL 
DEVELOPMENT GROUPS  
Local Development Groups, or LDGs, are at the heart of many recent donor initiatives 
aimed at building social capital world-wide, since membership of groups is commonly 
argued to be crucial to building trust and social cohesion (Weinberger and Jutting 
2001: 1395). A review of World Bank literature suggests that group membership is 
directly equated with social capital (also Narayan and Pritchett 1997; Grootaert and 
Narayan 2001). For instance:  
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‘To measure the density and importance of social connections in rural 
Tanzania in 1995, researchers asked households to list the groups they 
belonged to…They then constructed an index of social capital incorporating 
various aspects of membership….Villages rich in social capital had higher 
incomes than those with little. They were also much more likely to use 
fertilizer, agrochemical inputs, and improved seeds.’ (World Bank 1998: 
121) 
On the ground, the potential for groups to allow rapid disbursement of funds appears 
to be a particular factor in their favor among donors and local NGOs alike: Quotas for 
group formation and a 'scramble for groups' have been observed in many countries 
(e.g. Mishra et al. in press; Quirk 2003: 156-61 on India; Joshi 1998 on Nepal).   
Mayer and Rankin (2002) state that micro-finance models advocated by mainstream 
donors like the World Bank ‘respond more to lenders' concerns with financial 
sustainability than to traditions of fostering radical collective action…solidarity 
groups function foremost to cut costs and introduce financial discipline through peer 
pressure’. Much the same comment can be made regarding donor support of LDGs. 
 
In Ghana, the LDG has been promoted with remarkable persistence by donors, led by 
the World Bank. The broad donor perceptions concerning cultural harmony in Ghana 
that we described above may well have been an important contributory factor 
supporting this promotion. Community groups had been at the centre of development 
initiatives among donors and NGOs in Ghana well before social capital was taken up 
as a key theme by the World Bank, but the focus on LDGs has gathered pace over the 
last decade, so that most NGOs in Ghana now focus the majority of their activities on 
groups. Donor and NGO rhetoric emphasizes LDGs as central to liberal democracy 
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and democratic development in Ghana, but the sad reality is that numbers of groups 
and group members and associated loan recovery rates have become more prominent 
NGO targets than real improvement in living conditions or participation. Experience 
in the micro-credit sector in Asia seems to have a particularly strong impact on donor 
ideology about groups in Ghana, as elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. The Grameen 
bank in Bangladesh, in particular, is still commonly held up as a successful model, 
although the application of such Asian models in Ghana has been attributed by local 
academics to a lack of confidence in local ideas and identified as a factor which 
actually undermines local potential for change (Porter 2003). Senior figures in major 
local NGOs talk about being “rolled over” by donors because they lack the formal 
evidence (i.e. support from academic writings in international publications) to support 
their local perspectives. 
 
Ghana might well have been expected to present a fertile seedbed for donor group-
based initiatives because of its rich tradition of associational life and nationally 
promoted values of cooperation. However, important spatial distinctions can be 
drawn, for instance between northern and central Ghana and the coastal zone. These 
distinctions, which we suggest have been inadequately recognized by donors (and 
consequently their client NGOs), help shape the potential for success of group-based 
interventions on the ground in each region. A brief description of each zone and its 
history of group action helps set the national scene in which the more detailed 
discussion of the case study LDGs can then be placed. 
 
In the 1980s and 90s northern Ghana became the site of the majority of international 
and local NGO activity, because of its chronic poverty and limited infrastructural 
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development. (In the colonial era, this region was viewed principally as a labor 
reserve for southern gold mines and cocoa farms.) Initially assistance was focused on 
basic service delivery, though following the mid 1990s ethnic disturbances many 
NGOs expanded their focus to citizenship and ethnicity (Mohan 2002). Most NGOs 
working in northern Ghana now focus a majority of their activities on groups. There 
are many such associations: groups for agro-processing, revolving credit schemes 
with goats, groups for money literacy and income generation and so on.  Many of 
these programs are focused on women and some involve membership groups as large 
as 150.  
 
Central Ghana exhibits rather different local cultural, political and economic contexts 
from both northern Ghana and the coastal savannas. Much of the central area  - 
notably the Ashanti and Brong Ahafo Regions which form the Akan heartland - is 
richer than the north: it includes major maize and export cocoa producing zones, gold 
mining and timber production, and has more developed communications and 
infrastructure. This is a region capable of substantial community mobilization without 
external support, related to its history of opposition to central government and the 
tradition of demonstrating group support through funeral attendance (Dennis and 
Peprah 1995). NGO activity has been very limited in the region (Kyei 1999) because 
donor support for interventions is focused on Ghana’s poorer districts.  
 
Further contrast is offered by the coastal savanna region where there has also been 
little NGO involvement, despite the fact that there are considerable pockets of 
poverty. There is much dependence here on semi-substance farming and artisanal 
fishing and some areas are arguably as poor as northern Ghana. In recent years a 
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number of donor-led initiatives have extended into this zone (which is facing serious 
environmental problems) and a few International NGOs -- which had previously 
concentrated on northern Ghana -- have begun to operate more extensively here. 
Additionally, quite a few local NGOs have come into existence, though by 
comparison with northern Ghana their numbers remain comparatively low. Again, 
group-based activities have commonly been central to the development initiatives set 
in motion.    
 
Our discussion so far has shown how donors (and consequently both local and 
international NGOs - who mostly depend on donors for their survival) have adopted a 
relatively uniform concept of cooperation in groups. We now aim to demonstrate how 
and why attempts to implement this aspatial blueprint have been rejected or adapted, 
by reviewing the diverse experiences of group formation in one region, the coastal 
savanna zone.   
 
LDGS IN COASTAL GHANA: PATTERNS OF ADOPTION, ADAPTATION 
AND REJECTION  
 
Case 1:  Struggling to form groups: Ghana's Village Infrastructure Project and 
Intermediate Means of Transport  
This case study explores support for and resistance to group formation in a rural 
transport context. The broad donor development context is provided by the 
nationwide Village Infrastructure Project (hereafter VIP) which was established in the 
second half of the 1990s. Associated with the VIP was an Intermediate Means of 
Transport (hereafter IMT) project involving the Ghana Ministry of Agriculture's 
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Village Infrastructure Project Coordinating Unit. The experiences of five villages in 
Central Region not previously targeted under the broader VIP program were followed 
closely during the process of adoption of the Intermediate Transport project (IMT) to 
assess their impact within the villages. The latter evaluation was carried out as part of 
an action research project involving one of this chapter’s authors (Porter 2002a, 
2002b).  
 
The Village Infrastructure Project (VIP) is a World Bank funded program focused 
explicitly on rural community groups and associations in pilot locations across the 
country. Project components include rural water infrastructure, rural transport 
(including village tracks and trails and intermediate means of transport such as 
bicycles and trailers, power tillers and carts), post-harvest infrastructure (e.g drying 
facilities and so on) and institutional strengthening focused on the district assemblies. 
While previous programs relied more on existing groups, new groups can be eligible 
for assistance in this program, providing they register formally and have 
‘satisfactorily completed appropriate training in group dynamics and management 
through a partnership NGO’. A further requirement is evidence of group savings at a 
‘commercial bank’. 
 
We examine here those cases of local groups buying intermediate means of transport 
such as bicycles and trailers, power tillers, carts through the VIP and a similar set of 
equipment purchased through the IMT action research project. From the outset, 
problems have been identified around ‘group formation, dynamism and cohesion’ in 
the VIP (Anchirinah and Yoder 2000), particularly in cases where groups have been 
established for the purpose of receiving funds, and in those groups that share 
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equipment and maintenance. Successful groups were identified in the VIP where 
farmers had established the groups themselves, such as nnoboa (joint farm labor) 
work groups. However, shifting the emphasis of some of these groups and, in 
particular, building new groups has presented challenges. 
 
Interviews with inhabitants of the five villages in the action research project found 
negative attitudes to groups, raising questions about the reasons for such attitudes.  
Reluctance to form groups was found particularly in relation to perceptions about 
potential quarrels:  
'I would not consider group ownership because… it always includes 
quarrelling.' (Young woman, Assin-Aworabo)   
‘You would not get it [the IMT] whenever you need it.’ (Woman, Gomoa-
Sampa)   
Husbands tended to support this view, not wishing to see themselves drawn into 
village disputes: 'if there is trouble arising she would come to me' (Young husband, 
Aworabo). Indeed, in the subsequent implementation component of the action 
research when transport equipment was offered to villagers on credit, we found that 
only five pieces of IMT out of 70 were purchased by groups. One of these cases was 
in a small village (Gomoa-Abora) where most residents are inter-related and two 
groups purchased and managed equipment together.  
 
Moreover, the five groups have proved no faster than individuals in paying for their 
equipment. When we held review meetings with villagers in the five villages after a 
16-month monitoring period, four out of the five village reviews still came out 
strongly in favor of individual as opposed to group activities. There was a common 
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view among both women and men that group ownership of equipment would only be 
feasible if members were drawn from the same household, as otherwise there would 
be too many disputes about the use of equipment.  
 
Despite this apparent resistance to groups in the Central Region, district assemblies 
and administrative officers in these districts have favored group loans, specifically 
because they argue that the group will apply pressure on defaulting individuals. 
Moreover, local officials argue that loans to individuals are difficult because of the 
need for collateral and guarantors. They are particularly positive about the reliability 
of women's groups in meeting repayments because of the application of sanctions.   
VIP staff, meanwhile, argue that on a large project like VIP, groups are necessary not 
just because of the size of the project but in particular because VIP are focusing on the 
‘poorest of the poor’ and individuals could not afford IMTs (Authors’ meeting with 
VIP staff, Accra, 2000). At the same meeting, however, a Ministry of Agriculture 
representative from another department suggested that in the agro-processing field, 
individuals operated and managed the equipment better than groups, ‘although project 
staff find groups easier to manage’. By August 2000, one of the two District Chief 
Executives from the study districts was expressing some disillusionment with group 
work in the VIP. He found the VIP regulations around the use of long-standing groups 
operating their own account ‘too difficult’ and suggested that the project would work 
better through individuals.   
 
Government and NGO attachment to groups was still strongly in evidence, despite the 
clearly expressed negative attitude of villagers to group formation for development 
projects, as illustrated in the following comments:  
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‘Formation of strong groups is needed’ (Staff member, Feeder Roads 
Department)  
‘Women's groups can guarantee credit… already existing women's groups 
can easily be contacted for the use of IMTs… women's groups can guarantee 
for credit facilities’ (NGO regional project officer)  
‘Women's groups can influence others to use IMTs' (Government officer)  
‘Women's groups are a force to be reckoned with. They can easily move to 
NGOs for funding.  Repayment is guaranteed’ (NGO staff member) 
One small workshop discussion continued to list the following advantages of groups 
(presented by a government staff member):  
'As a group, can influence one another to adopt the IMT; can easily organize 
their members for training and education; can guarantee for credit and ensure 
repayment; as a unified front can easily approach local and international 
NGOs for support.'   
At local government level, however, there was some expressed bemusement that 
groups were patently not working in Gomoa district. One district officer spoke out at 
the workshop in evident frustration, ‘Why can’t it work here with groups?’. He 
received no response. 
 
Case 2 Struggling to sustain groups: the case of inventory credit and processing 
groups 
Farmer groups also lay at the heart of two agricultural projects managed by an 
International NGO in the Central Region of Ghana. The inventory credit program 
allowed groups of farmers and crop processors to receive micro-credit from local 
banks using their produce as collateral. Under this system, groups stored their produce 
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at an inventory site and then received 70 percent of the market price at that time. 
When the market price rose after the harvesting period, the produce could be sold and 
farmers were paid the value of their crop minus the initial credit and the cost of 
storage. The organization of groups was carefully supervised and coordinated by 
NGO staff who played a key role in their functioning. Of crucial importance was the 
fact that there were two locks for the store. The key to one lock was held by the 
group, and the other key was held by NGO staff. The banks did not appear to be 
willing to lend inventory credit unless a trusted NGO was actively involved. This 
raised questions regarding the sustainability of the group after the departure of the 
highly trained, motivated and mobile staff currently involved.  
 
Interestingly, the pilot scheme to introduce this inventory credit program and 
associated group marketing to (new and established) farmer groups in selected areas 
of Ghana (Volta, Eastern and Central Regions) seems to have had least success in the 
coastal zones of Central Region, though it was subsequently adopted with apparent 
success further north in Brong Ahafo and northern Ghana. The groups’ success in 
Brong Ahafo was attributed to the ‘better operation of farmer groups there than in 
Central Region’ by the NGO which organized this program (Authors’ interview, 
Acra, 1999)
i
. Some groups were able to repay the start-up loans sooner than others, 
with success attributed by the NGO workers to the behavior and commitment of the 
equipment operators and managers who collect fees for using the equipment and 
prepare the accounts.  
 
This research demonstrates the importance of understanding how social capital is 
culturally specific and how the issues of trust and sanctions need to be understood as 
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part of the cultural context. In the context of this project, the ability to sustain trust 
was found to be based on norms of reciprocity and the ability to exert sanctions. 
Norms also shaped what sanctions are deemed acceptable, and the implicit acceptance 
of particular types of authority such as the chieftaincy system. One of the groups had 
particular success, reportedly due to the specific commitment of a woman leader and 
to the fact that the machine operator belonged to the same church as some of the 
leading members (which may add additional moral pressure in his case). Groups with 
effective, committed leaders, and some previous experience of working together are 
more likely to be successful in this context. However, of the four sites established, 
only one was operating fully in 2004 due to the inability to invest in maintenance. In 
contrast, there are other types of groups in the locality that do sustain themselves over 
decades such as trader associations.  
 
The failure of groups in the farmers’ groups is attributable to a lack of 
conceptualization of what makes groups work and how they are underpinned by 
culture. In particular, the expected form of leadership and organization were 
transplanted from Western cooperative models (with a chair, secretary and treasurer), 
while ignoring the local forms of leadership modeled on the chieftaincy system which 
have been adapted by women trader associations that has a ‘queen’ and elders. 
Cooperation within groups is also dependent on issues of trust. Trust is essential for 
cooperation because it provides the foundation on which other individuals’ actions 
within a group initiative are accepted as being either for the overall benefit of the 
group or without disadvantage for the group. Trust comes about through an 
expectation that those being trusted will cooperate (Lyon 2000). Trust seems to grow 
on the back of accepted cultural norms that specific people will cooperate, keep verbal 
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agreements and act reciprocally. In the Akan group of languages in Ghana the nearest 
equivalent term to trust is gyedi which also means confidence, knowledge of a 
person's ability, belief and faith all of which in Ghana are firmly intertwined with 
concepts of reputation.   
 
Trust cannot be fully understood without reference to processes of power and control 
(compare Watson, this volume). Power over others is utilized by individuals within 
the group, or by the group as a whole, to maintain control over group trajectories, and 
punish deviant behavior. This latter type of power a) enables specific values of the 
dominant interests to become recognized as group norms (implying moral obligation 
and routine/habitual compliance), b) allows surveillance of members' activities and 
behavior (which may ultimately either support or destroy trust) and c) realizes threats 
or actual action when deviant behavior occurs. The sanctions which are ultimately 
imposed may take various forms, from group displeasure with the individual 
(expressed verbally or by actions, including apparent loss of trust and application of 
corrective pressure), through expulsion from the group to possible initiation of 
broader actions. Such actions may involve the wider community in implementing 
social and/or financial punishments, bringing loss of prestige and shame, a 'bad name', 
financial loss and even physical attack. When major sins are committed it may be 
necessary for the 'sinner' to leave the community altogether. 
 
CULTURAL INSENSITIVITY AND THE (MIS)UNDERSTANDING OF 
TRUST AND NORMS  
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The projects described above illustrate a number of factors that shape cooperation 
including the key roles of risk, trust and sanctions. We argue that these issues are not 
considered in the donors’ use of the term social capital due to their lack of 
understanding of cultural heterogeneity in relation to local norms, attitudes and 
history. In order to further understand these complex patterns of resistance and 
compliance to donor pressures to form groups in Ghana we need to consider a range 
of possible influencing factors, including specific agro-ecological conditions and their 
impact on prevailing livelihood opportunities and practices, related migration 
histories, the likely impact of remoteness, transport accessibility and proximity to 
urban areas, and varying histories of NGO intervention. All these issues shape the 
cultural factors which may predispose people to favor or disfavor group action.   
 
Cooperation is sustained if there is trust or an expectation that other members being 
trusted will cooperate when it might be in their own interest not to. It operates when 
there is confidence in other agents, despite uncertainty, risk and the possibility that 
those agents may act opportunistically (Misztal 1996: 18, Gambetta 1988: 218-9). The 
more people work and associate together, the more trust may grow (Granovetter 1994: 
463; compare James, this volume) and the more it can be used to support new types of 
interaction. Trust grows on the back of accepted cultural norms that people will 
cooperate, keep the verbal agreements and act reciprocally.   
 
Decisions to cooperate in LDGs are shaped by both conscious calculation and habitual 
action, sometimes by unquestioning compliance or obedience. Cleaver points out in a 
slightly different but related context, ‘non-participation and non-compliance may be 
both a “rational” strategy and an unconscious practice embedded in routine, social 
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norms and the acceptance of the status quo’ (2001:51). Sanctions are also an 
important part of trust relations and based on power relations, accepted values of 
hierarchy, conceptions of authority and economic power as discussed above. Norms 
shape what behavior is considered acceptable and what sanctions can be taken. These 
vary depending on whether the relationship is with kin, community members or non-
community members.  
 
The issue of social capital and sanctions in kin groups raises specific questions about 
the ability to work with family groups. An environmental NGO working in southern 
Ghana has begun to move from a focus on community lands to family-lands in project 
development, recognizing the diversity of interest within ‘communities’. This has led 
to a change from supplying community nurseries to supplying family holdings with 
trees. However, family group activities may fail to operate precisely because it is so 
difficult to impose harsh sanctions on deviant members or because they fail to address 
gender inequalities within the family (Molyneux 2002). Kin-based groups also, by 
definition, bar non-family members.   
  
However, donors fail to see how their interventions are being re-interpreted and how 
groups actually function in practice. Local gender relations, for instance may have a 
critical influence on group potential. Most development groups tend to have a 
(mostly) unpaid executive  - leader, secretary, treasurer - who play an important 
supervisory role. In Ghana, as elsewhere in low-income countries, most of the 
executive tends to comprise literate males. Women may be excluded explicitly on the 
basis that they lack writing and accounting skills, a factor which then often prevents 
women gaining equal benefits from group activities and may ultimately disadvantage 
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group progress (Lyon, 2003) unless individual strong and committed women emerge 
as leaders.   
 
The local development group is commonly expected by donors to exist for a 
substantial period as a stable entity, through the (frequently slow) period of project 
planning and eventual inauguration to actual activities on the ground, to maintain its 
membership and its external alliances. Although groups are best when longlasting, 
benefits may simply take too long to emerge, when measured against other livelihood 
options, and may have been misrepresented by NGOs and District staff or 
misconstrued by groups. Moreover, in Ghana's traditional non-formal groups there is 
often a tendency for non-kin based associations to shift membership, focus, rules and 
external alliances fairly rapidly in response to changing social, economic and political 
conditions in a way which is not anticipated by donors in LDGs. Similar dynamism 
and fluidity among non-formal groups has been observed in Tanzania (de Weerdt 
2001).   
   
As local participants  - district authorities, implementing NGOs and group members 
themselves - may recognize, the crucial factor ultimately is likely to be the power of 
surveillance and censure, but this component may be the one most difficult to graft 
artificially. Indeed, particular problems in a development context seem to stem from 
donor’s inadequate conceptualization of sanctions in theorizing around social capital 
and the potential of group action. As we have illustrated in our case study, grass-roots 
development workers are often far more aware than donors that group enterprises 
involve relationships which may incur social costs both for members and for non-
members: peer pressure, loss of trust, and exclusion of the poorest and most 
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vulnerable. It is not necessarily a win-win scenario and while direct and indirect costs 
(time, money, materials, argument etc.) are likely to be incurred at an early stage, 
direct and indirect benefits (income, information, facilities etc.) may take some years 
to become visible (Weinberger and Jutting 2001). The ability to impose sanctions is 
likely to vary spatially, with urban proximity causing particular potential difficulties 
(an observation supported by Freidberg [2001] with reference to problems of 
collaboration around Bobo-Dioulasso, Burkina Faso), a point we discuss further 
below. 
 
GEOGRAPHY, CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN 
GHANA  
Our findings in Ghana suggest that the ability to build trust and impose sanctions 
varies substantially across regions, within regions and between different cultural 
registers, especially where externally initiated LDGs are concerned.  
 
The widespread existence of active donor supported LDGs in northern Ghana appears 
logical in the context of that region’s relative remoteness, its associated lack of 
livelihood opportunities and its relatively long history (by Ghanaian standards) of 
NGO intervention. In this context, when an NGO arrives with the promise of largesse, 
and this is predicated on group formation, the pressure to cooperate will commonly be 
intense. If some livelihoods improve even marginally as a result – particularly those 
of more powerful community members – the group is likely to be sustained, or at least 
a semblance of group action maintained whenever the potential for external assistance 
appears on the horizon. Given the shortage of other local options, benefits from the 
group become part of an overall livelihood strategy and there can be strong peer 
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pressure on individuals to cooperate. Additionally, in northern Ghana there may be 
social (as opposed to economic) benefits for women from group formation since 
cultural constraints can limit their activities and travel to distant places. Our research 
findings are supported by studies elsewhere showing that group operations may allow 
women a good excuse to meet and even occasional opportunities for travel to NGO 
offices at district and regional headquarters (Townsend et al. 1995).  
 
In the Brong Ahafo and Ashanti regions, livelihood opportunities are far greater than 
in the northern regions and thus the imperative to form groups from this perspective 
seems lower. However, there is much evidence in this region that groups have been a 
traditional component of the rural livelihoods repertoire. Relationships are often built 
up carefully over time, especially in remoter rural areas, so that community 
mobilization, including associated group formation, is feasible. Nnoboa groups, for 
instance, are formed by groups of farmers to undertake working parties at labor 
bottleneck periods, and many other groups may emerge from time to time. Thus, 
although there has been much less NGO intervention in this region, because of its 
perceived comparative wealth, traditional group formation is common (Lyon and 
Porter 2005). Consequently, when NGOs do intervene, we might hypothesize that 
grassroots interest in LDGs is likely to be sustained, especially in remoter rural areas. 
In the case of inventory credit (see case 2 above), this hypothesis was confirmed. 
  
The coastal savanna zone, where much of our research was conducted, provides other 
lessons. In more accessible areas, and particularly those areas close to major cities and 
in settlements along major highways, populations are fluid, people come and go with 
the farming and fishing seasons and according to other non-seasonal opportunities 
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which become available. ‘Straddling’ the urban-rural divide has intensified as a 
feature of life in this part of Ghana since early colonial settlement, and has accelerated 
since the introduction of Structural Adjustment Policies by the World Bank in 1983. 
Group formation is likely to be more difficult in these locations within the coastal belt 
because individuals can far more easily disappear into a distant suburb or to another 
town where fellow group members and creditors cannot find them without 
considerable effort. In addition to this broad pattern of rural-urban mobility, there are 
substantial migrations of fishermen, their wives and families as the fishing fleets 
move up and down the West African coast – from Abidjan to Lagos and beyond. Not 
only may these migrations further destabilize the potential for developing trust and 
sanctions. Such national and international migrations also make it particularly 
difficult for the kind of spatially-based groups favored by donors to become 
established and develop the necessary link to local NGOs in order to obtain funding 
for specific activities. Particular examples of group failure were given by villagers 
concerning susu (non-formal rotational group saving and lending schemes). In coastal 
fishing villages like Dogo in Gomoa district and Ada Foah in Dangbe East district, the 
poor experience of development groups has turned many residents against group 
schemes in general (Village interviews 1997). It has possibly been a major cause of 
lack of trust in new (especially externally initiated) group enterprises among 
inhabitants of many other settlements in coastal Ghana.  
 
Despite these problems, even in the coastal zone, groups may work in particular 
circumstances. In case study 1, family bonds were sufficiently strong in one village to 
overcome the potentially disruptive influences of urban proximity and allow some 
group purchase of intermediate means of transport. The four other IMT study 
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settlements were located inland, off the paved road (between eight and 25 km distant), 
on bad roads with relatively poor access to transport. They thus might have been 
expected to provide contexts relatively favorable to cooperation. However, the 
widespread reluctance to undertake NGO-promoted group activities among the Fanti 
even in less accessible areas, may lie in regional historical experience of defaulting 
from groups described above. In some cases communities may not have suffered 
actual bad experiences, but the mere publicity that cases of absconding receive often 
seems sufficient to deter moves towards group activity, despite pressures for group 
formation from NGO staff. This reluctance may be encouraged by the greater self-
reliance and choice that people have due to the history of cash cropping in this region, 
as well as the lack of sanctions available to stop them.  
  
CONCLUSION  
Donor interventions to support social capital in many cases appear to be misguided. 
These interventions, founded upon the World Bank’s limited conceptualization of 
social capital, emphasize a ‘win-win’ scenario of trust and empowerment in groups, 
and have been essentialized as support for Local Development Groups. Many such 
projects end up focusing on specific groups which are easy to work with, essentially 
turning a blind eye to class, ethnic, gender and other such social and political 
divisions in communities and reinforcing local structures of inequality and 
discrimination (Brohman 1996; Atack 1999; also Watts, this volume). There is 
growing evidence to suggest that this has been the case in northern Ghana (Mohan 
2002).   
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Our chapter has charted how, while donors and other have been pursuing the LDG as 
a development tool in Ghana, the geography of cultural development has inserted a 
powerful, yet unanticipated by policy-makers, complication into this process. We 
have shown how group activities in Ghana are firmly embedded in local-regional 
cultural conceptions and attitudes: these may bring intra-group solidarity or they may 
encourage contestation and disharmony. There may thus be fundamental disjunctions 
between what donors expect of groups and what groups might be realistically 
expected to achieve (in specific cultural and economic contexts) and between donor 
and grass-roots perspectives on how groups will operate on the ground. Given the 
limited geographical imagination of donor discourses concerning LDGs,
ii
 their failure 
in certain locational contexts in Ghana hardly surprises. It can be argued that this is 
directly attributable to limitations of the social capital literature which has not only 
failed to give adequate consideration to the importance of history (a now widely 
accepted criticism) but also neglects the crucial significance of geography (see 
Introduction, this volume).   
 
Moreover, the chapter illustrates how the potential to build social capital is highly 
dependent on locational context: namely on regional cultural history, prevailing 
livelihoods and opportunities, remoteness, migration patterns, and a range of other 
(sometimes highly localized) economic or socio-cultural factors (such as female 
seclusion and gender relations), what we might term the variations in cultural 
economy. These factors interact to produce specific local conditions that have the 
potential to either support or destabilize social relations in simple or complex ways, 
predisposing people to accept or reject group projects.   
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Building trust (and so-called social capital) commonly hinges on developing an 
intimate knowledge of people’s character, personal and family circumstances, being 
able to monitor their actions and test them gradually over time, and, most critically, 
knowing where to find them if trust is misplaced and sanctions have to be imposed. It 
is not surprising then that we find cooperation between non-family groups and group 
action in response to external development interventions tends to be stronger in those 
parts of Ghana where local options are limited by local agro-ecological conditions and 
conditions favor close and regular interactions. All of the factors listed above have an 
inherently spatial component which may either favor or disfavor group action.  
 
Returning to our coastal case study region, the net development result of failures at 
group formation and associated problems with disbursement of funds in coastal 
Ghana is probably to further encourage concentration of development funds in 
northern Ghana, where there is greater willingness to work in groups according to 
donor requirements, despite the fact that poverty in coastal districts of Central Region 
is on a similar scale to that in the north. Meanwhile, in parts of coastal Ghana (and 
probably elsewhere) the requirement for pre-formed groups and working through 
groups may be actually diverting development efforts by local NGOs away from 
assistance to those individuals and traditional non-formal groups most needful of 
support, and creating further disillusionment among those communities which have 
been subjected to development. Such long-term outcomes illustrate the power of 
development concepts such as social capital, as well as highlighting the ongoing 
processes that underpin the reproduction of uneven landscapes of development.   
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Far from illustrating a genuine cultural turn in development thinking, donor adoption 
of social capital concepts arguably reflects a continuing lack of sensitivity to cultural 
diversity and the specific geographical contexts within which diverse cultural registers 
(elite, popular and youth cultures, among others) evolve and interact. Economists 
continue to set and rule the agenda, despite the growing numbers of anthropologists 
and other social scientists employed by the World Bank and other donors. The 
consequences are well illustrated by recent donor development initiatives in Ghana. 
Although donors less commonly voice concerns about project replicability and 
generic approaches than they did in the late 1990s, there nevertheless appears to be a 
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 NOTES  
 
                                                 
i  The same international NGO had also been supporting mechanized oil palm 
processing projects in the Central Region as part of a contract with the World Bank. 
ii  Compare Radcliffe and Laurie (this volume) on imaginative geographies of 
policy.  
